Russia can’t afford to discredit itself abroad, nor can Putin’s ruling United Russia party afford to discredit itself at home four months before the next polls, by threatening overwhelming retaliation against Ukraine if it attacks Moscow’s Victory Day parade only to symbolically retaliate or do nothing at all.
The Russian Defense Ministry warned local civilians and the staff of diplomatic missions in Kiev of their country’s plans to launch a massive retaliatory strike on the city center if Ukraine goes through with Zelensky’s threat to attack Moscow’s Victory Day parade on 9 May. This was followed by Russia announcing ballistic missile tests from Kamchatka from 6-10 May. Shortly afterwards, the Russian Foreign Ministry reiterated the Defense Ministry’s warning, thus ensuring that the world is aware of it.
This threat likely isn’t a bluff for three sequential reasons. The first is that Russia wants to deter Ukraine from attacking Moscow’s Victory Day parade for self-evident reasons, both relating to optics and the security of its VIPs, to which end it threatened overwhelming retaliation if this happens. The second reason is that Russia cannot threaten such a response without actually going through with it if provoked, otherwise it would irredeemably discredit itself, and more audacious attacks would then likely follow.
And third, Russia is finally signaling its willingness to overwhelmingly retaliate against decision-making centers in Kiev per the Foreign Ministry’s additionally specified threat in the event of Ukraine carrying out this high-profile provocation due to its hardline Kremlin faction partially superceding its moderate one. To explain, Putin hitherto restrained his military due his belief in “The Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” as well as his concerns about an uncontrollable escalation spiral sparking World War III.
Once Trump returned and responded positively to Putin’s offer of dialogue for resolving the NATO-Russian proxy war in Ukraine, which Biden rejected, Putin and his fellow moderates dangled a resource-centric strategic partnership for incentivizing compromises. The US was receptive to such a partnership, but Russia rejected its demanded compromises that were presented as a precondition, while the US rejected Russia’s own such demands and didn’t coerce compliance from Ukraine or NATO either.
While Trump declined to escalate the Ukrainian Conflict amid this impasse, he still greenlit the rolling back of Russian influence across the world in a bid to coerce Putin into the US’ demanded compromise, namely freezing the conflict in exchange for sanctions relief without resolving the root issues. Informally known as the “Neo-Reagan Doctrine”, it’s placed Russia under pressure in at least 15 different countries, thus discrediting the moderate faction and prompting some among it like Putin to rethink their views.
The Third Gulf War, in which Iran attacked regional US bases without triggering an uncontrollable escalation spiral, then convinced Putin to finally listen to the hardliners who’ve been urging massive strikes on Ukrainian decision-making centers in Kiev since the get-go. Public opinion, which is important ahead of September’s next Duma elections, has long aligned with the hardliners on this issue. Putin now seems to have assented but only in retaliation to Ukrainian attacks against Moscow’s Victory Day parade.
These factors make it unlikely that Russia is bluffing, in which case the country itself wouldn’t just be discredited abroad, but so too would the ruling United Russia party be discredited in voters’ eyes four months before the next polls. There’s already speculation of a protest vote in support of the communist and nationalist opposition parties, which might prompt various reforms if it happens, but a large-scale one driven by any hypothetical bluff could herald an era of uncertainty that Putin would prefer to avoid.
