Like it or not, for several centuries now, Hobbes’s nation-state concept has been the default paradigm and context for modern people whenever they think about government. Without having ever read Hobbes, people will unknowingly repeat his assumptions, presuppositions, concerns, and arguments for the state. Yet—with some simple logic and using Hobbes’s own presuppositions—we can internally critique Hobbes’s argument and see that his proposed solution of the state solves none of the problems he presents.
A Brief Review of Hobbes’s Theory of the State
In essence, Hobbes’s argumentation for the state can be captured in the following quote,
The finall Cause, End, or Designe of men, (who naturally love Liberty, and Dominion over others,) in the introduction of that restraint upon themselves, (in which wee see them live in Common-wealths,) is the foresight of their own preservation, and of a more contented life thereby; that is to say, of getting themselves out from that miserable condition of Warre, which is necessarily consequent. . .to the naturall Passions of men, when there is no visible Power to keep them in awe, and tye them by feare of punishment to the performance of their Covenants, and observation of these Lawes of Nature. . . (emphasis added)
According to Hobbes, “Hereby it is manifest, that during the time men live without a common Power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called Warre; and such a warre, as is of every man, against every man.” Therefore, following his reasoning, the state provides a common power to “keep them all in awe,” discouraging interpersonal crime and conflict through fear of punishment by the state.
Hobbes’s argument is that—due to the insecurity of the “state of nature” (absolute human freedom to exercise power prior to the state)—we agreed and consented to live in society with one another ruled by a state which could provide security through a legal monopoly on violence.
In a previous article, I critiqued Hobbes’s argument for the necessity of the state based on human nature. While not exhaustive, this article seeks to internally critique several other points of Hobbes’s argument.
The Myth of Collective Security
Collective security does not mean private, voluntary arrangements of individuals by which they contract together for mutual self-defense. Instead, collective security entails the necessity of the state to legally and coercively tax everyone and provide a monopoly of security services.
According to the theory, the permanent underproduction of security in the Hobbesian “state of nature,” the potential threat of violence of other humans, the potential for betrayal in any contract-agreements, and the constant sense of insecurity all arguably contributed to a lower standard of living for all with no alternative to escape it. Therefore, individuals consented together to live in society and give all rights and power over to a political state, enabled to coercively tax people in order to provide security from internal and external threats.
In The Myth of National Defense, Hans-Hermann Hoppe writes,
The solution to this presumably intolerable situation, according to Hobbes and his followers, is the establishment of a state. In order to institute peaceful cooperation among themselves, two individuals, A and B, require a third independent party, S, as ultimate judge and peacemaker. However, this third party, S. . .is a sovereign and has as such two unique powers. On the one hand, S can insist that his subjects, A and B, not seek protection from anyone but him; that is, S is a compulsory territorial monopolist of protection. On the other hand, S can determine unilaterally how much A and B must spend on their own security; that is, S has the power to impose taxes in order to provide security “collectively.” (emphasis added)
Put simply, the Hobbesian state is a compulsory territorial monopolist of protection that may restrict competition and it can determine how much to charge people for its services and legally force them to pay for those services.
While we will list contradictions more systematically later, we should note several here regarding the myth of collective security. For one, the state aims to constrain human nature but authorizes and empowers an elite of unaccountable humans. Next, the state aims to protect private property and rights by violating private property and rights. And, the state aims to reduce interpersonal conflict between non-state actors through threats and a legal monopoly on violence. In other words, the state claims to offer protection from others, but not from itself.
It would be one thing to argue that force must be used to counter force. That is the argument of self-defense and mutual security. But Hobbes’s argumentation requires monopolized aggression to meet the problem of general, non-state aggression—concentration of illegitimate force. Individual or mutual self-defense is the legitimate use of force or threat of force to protect individual rights (self-ownership and property); so-called collective security involves the concentration and monopolization of aggression in the name of limiting aggression.
The Definition & Legitimacy Contradiction
In Hobbes’s argument for the state:
Consent establishes the state’s sovereignty;Sovereignty defines legitimate authority;Legitimate authority validates sovereign state coercion;Sovereign state coercion overrides dissent and withdrawal of consent;Legitimacy ultimately rests on the authority established by the sovereign itself
Hobbes attempts to justify the legitimacy of the state through the social contract: individuals consent to surrender certain freedoms and rights to a sovereign in exchange for security and social order. Hobbes argues that, in the state of nature, individuals possess broad rights of self-preservation, including the use of force. Yet this creates a deeper problem.
Legitimate authority normally derives from rights that individuals themselves possess and can delegate. But even if individuals possess coercive rights in the state of nature, it does not necessarily follow that they can irrevocably transfer those rights to an institution claiming a compulsory monopoly on force within a territory. The theory therefore becomes circular and self-referential: the state is said to be legitimate because individuals authorize it, yet the authority being exercised exceeds the ordinary ethical authority of any individual and becomes legitimate primarily through institutional designation itself.
As a result, the distinction between state coercion and private coercion rests less on the nature of the act than on the status of the actor claiming sovereign authority. Unlike other forms of authority, the Hobbesian state cannot establish legitimacy merely by asserting a monopoly on force. Its authority requires ethical justification beyond its own institutional self-authorization.
The Problem of A Unitary Global State
Following Hobbes’s logic to its conclusion reveals another serious flaw. If a single sovereign is necessary to prevent conflict between individuals, then logically a single global state would be necessary to prevent conflict between nations. Yet even Hobbes’s defenders typically reject this conclusion, exposing the inconsistency in the original argument.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe writes,
Once it is assumed that, in order to institute peaceful cooperation between A and B, it is necessary to have a state S, a twofold conclusion follows. If more than one state exists—S1, S2, S3—then, just as there can presumably be no peace among A and B without S, so can there be no peace between the states S1, S2, and S3 as long as they remain in a state of nature (i.e., a state of anarchy) with regard to each other. Consequently, in order to achieve universal peace, political centralization, unification, and ultimately the establishment of a single world government are necessary.
Contradictions, Meta-Contradiction, & Conclusion
The Hobbesian solution does not eliminate the problems it alleges to solve; it institutionalizes them. We should note the inconsistencies between the stated concerns and priorities that allegedly necessitate the state:
The state attempts to solve the problem of self-interested and power-seeking humans by concentrating power in the hands of self-interested and power-seeking humans;The state claims to secure property and stability while reserving the authority to override both whenever sovereign necessity demands it;The state claims to reduce violence and interpersonal conflict through threats, coercion, and a legal monopoly on violence;The state seeks to eliminate insecurity by establishing an institution possessing greater coercive power than any private actor;The state claims to provide security and dispute resolution while legally prohibiting competing providers of those same services;The state claims legitimacy through the consent of the governed, yet consent ceases to have meaningful force once the state is established;The state defines itself as the sole legitimate user of force while circularly treating its own coercion as legitimate and identical private acts as criminal;The logic of Hobbesian political centralization points toward a single world sovereign, yet most defenders reject that conclusion
These internal critiques ought to demonstrate that Hobbes’s theory of the state is self-defeating on its own terms. Externally, we might also note that the state claims to reduce the scale and scope of violence despite producing the largest systems of organized violence in human history. Rather than creating genuine security, Hobbes’s solution simply transfers the problem of violence from private actors to a monopolistic entity. In short, every problem the state claims to solve, it solves by doing more of the very thing it claims to be solving.
Underlying all of these specific contradictions is a single, fundamental meta-contradiction:
The theory of the state begins with empirical claims about human nature and the dangers of human behavior, then proceeds to construct an institution that is staffed by those same dangerous humans, grants them vastly greater power than any private actor could accumulate, removes the accountability mechanisms that constrain private actors, and creates incentives that systematically reward the most ruthless and power-hungry individuals.
Aggressive violence is reduced through aggressive violence. Property is protected through property violation. Conflict is resolved through coercive monopoly. Accountability is enforced through unaccountable power. This is not a series of unfortunate policy failures—it is the structural logic of the institution itself.
Given the paradigm of the state, we should not be surprised that unaccountable power tends to attract the power-hungry and the immoral while it repels the scrupulous and ethical. F. A. Hayek wrote a chapter in The Road to Serfdom called “Why the Worst Get on Top.” In this chapter he wrote,
Just as the democratic statesman who sets out to plan economic life will soon be confronted with the alternative of either assuming dictatorial powers or abandoning his plans, so the totalitarian leader would soon have to choose between disregard of ordinary morals and failure. It is for this reason that the unscrupulous are likely to be more successful in a society tending toward totalitarianism.
. . .
Advancement within a totalitarian group or party depends largely on a willingness to do immoral things.
. . .
To be a useful assistant in the running of a totalitarian state, therefore, a man must be prepared to break every moral rule he has ever known if this seems necessary to achieve the end set for him. In the totalitarian machine there will be special opportunities for the ruthless and unscrupulous.
