Did Israel’s Rivalry With Turkiye Play A Major Role In Its Recognition Of Somaliland?

Conor here: While Korybko argues Israel’s move is about the Turkish presence in Somalia, let’s not forget about others present there.

The US has several hundred troops (at least) in Somalia  mostly connected to the Danab (“Lightning”) Brigade, a U.S.-sponsored Special Ops Force that was established in 2014.

Last year, the US signed a deal with the government of Somalia to construct up to five military bases for the Somali National Army in the name of bolstering the army’s capabilities in the ongoing fight against militant groups. The bases are mostly intended for Danab, which the US at first funded from the State Department, which contracted with private security firm Bancroft Global. More recently, funding comes from the Pentagon’s proxy war fund called the 127e program, which bypasses congressional oversight by allowing US special operations forces to use foreign military units as surrogates in counterterrorism missions.

Will the Trump administration follow Israel in recognizing Somaliland? With Trump fond of bragging about how his administration is bought and paid for by oligarch zionists, it wouldn’t be a surprise, but for now Trump is saying the issue needs “more study.” He’s no doubt pouring over historical documents and scholarly research at this very moment, so that position could change any minute.

Despite the fact that Somalia receives US aid to pay government salaries, it launched a mega lobbying campaign following Trump’s victory, hiring big time firms like BGR. According to Africa Report, the Somali president is also attempting to win over Elon Musk by giving him a Starlink license to operate in the country. Meanwhile, Somaliland, aware of its strategic position, is trying to sell itself as a modern day Panama, appealing to the US desire to control critical shipping chokepoints.

In July, Somaliland offered the US access to a strategic military base near the Red Sea and deals on critical minerals in exchange for official recognition. Washington has yet to jump at the offer, most likely because of how it would complicate the US presence in Somalia.

Although US and Israel partner in crime in the region, the UAE, already enjoys a sizeable presence in Somaliland where it operates a port and military airstrip in Berbera and that hasn’t stopped Abu Dhabi from port and base presences in Somalia.

Project 2025 recommends “the recognition of Somaliland statehood as a hedge against the U.S.’s deteriorating position in Djibouti.” As Semafor reported a year ago, members of the Trump administration have expressed interest in recognizing Somaliland: The move could enable US intelligence to set up long term operations to monitor the movement of weapons in a volatile region as well as keep an eye on Chinese activity. And in January an influential US-China subcommittee in the US House of Representatives called for the State Department to open a representative office in Somaliland.

The increase of US airstrikes in Somalia (up to at least 119 in the first year of Trump 2.0, more than double the previous record) helps destabilize the situation further, leading to increased calls for Somaliland recognition. Again, the Trump administration is just ramping up existing US policy with a twist. Collective Biden formally upheld Somalia’s territorial integrity, but the Pentagon showed interest in a presence in Berbera, with several visits by AFRICOM officials.

For now, condemnation of Israel’s move has been swift from across Africa and the Middle East (and China), but do any of them mean it, and are any prepared to do anything about it?

By Andrew Korybko, a Moscow-based American political analyst who specializes in the global systemic transition to multipolarity in the New Cold War. He has a PhD from MGIMO, which is under the umbrella of the Russian Foreign Ministry. Originally published at his website.

Israel obtains strategic depth in proximity to Turkiye’s Somali facilities for monitoring and – if need be – destroying them if evidence emerges that they’re being used for nuclear purposes like its media now suspects is the purpose behind its planned spaceport and military cooperation with Pakistan there.

Israel just became the first UN member state to recognize Somaliland. Some casual observers believe that this is driven by the desire to have an allied presence in proximity to Iranian-allied and Houthi-controlled North Yemen and/or ahead of Somaliland reportedly accepting large numbers of Gazans. Regarding the first hypothesis, Israel has already proven that it can strike North Yemen without difficulty so it doesn’t need a regional base to do so, while the second alleged imperative isn’t a priority anymore.

The present piece argues that the real reason why Israel unexpectedly made this move at this precise moment in time is actually due to its rivalry with Turkiye. Casual observers probably aren’t aware, but Turkiye nowadays exerts influence over practically every sphere of significance in Somalia, which lends credence to an alarming national security scenario from Israel’s perspective that’ll be discussed shortly. Before getting to that, it’s important to briefly review exactly what influence Turkiye has there.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency, its version of USAID, has implemented more than 500 projects since beginning operations in 2011. Turkiye has also been training Somali forces since the opening of its TURKSOM base, its largest overseas one, in 2017. Their economic and military cooperation was then strengthened through a related pact in early 2024, which will modernize the Somali Navy in exchange for Somalia reportedly giving Turkiye 90% of its offshore energy revenue.

By year’s end, Somalia confirmed that Turkiye is building a spaceport on its territory, which an earlier report claimed could have the dual purpose of a ballistic missile test-fire site (the Eastern Mediterranean is too congested for Turkiye to test such arms from its own territory unlike the western Indian Ocean). Earlier this summer, Turkiye’s (de facto junior) partner Pakistan signed a similar military training deal with Somalia, thus representing a conspicuous convergence of their military interests in that country.

All of this led to the popular Israel Hayom’s piece in early December about how “Turkey’s quiet power play in the Red Sea turns Somalia into a proxy”, which discussed an alarming national security scenario that contextualizes Israel’s Somaliland decision. According to them, Turkiye is building a “second strategic geography” in Somalia for testing nuclear weapons and delivery systems (under the cover of its spaceport), which it could obtain through Nigerien uranium and Pakistani missile and nuclear expertise.

While some might scoff at this, the thanks that Netanyahu gave to the Mossad chief in his post about Israel’s recognition of Somaliland suggests that his decision was indeed driven by very serious national security considerations, most likely those pertaining to what was described above. By recognizing Somaliland, Israel could obtain strategic depth in proximity to Turkiye’s Somali facilities for monitoring and – if need be – destroying them if evidence emerges that they’re being used for nuclear purposes.

From Somaliland, Israel could also orchestrate political campaigns for weakening Turkiye’s (arguably hegemonic) hold over Somalia as a means of preemptively averting this worst-case scenario through non-kinetic means, which Somaliland might allow since this helps ensure its own security. The takeaway is that Israel recognized Somaliland more for reasons related to its rivalry with Turkiye than with Iran, and given what’s at stake, Turkiye might soon encourage Somalia to stir more trouble with Somaliland.