Trump’s attack on Iran has put to the test the limits of what “America First” means. The division inside the MAGA movement over its definition goes beyond semantics; it’s a quest for legitimate authority—what the Romans called auctoritas. It originally referred to the legitimacy to dictate a prescribed course of action based on the respect commanded by the person or institution that issued it. The decision carried a heavy moral weight, though it was not law.
Since Trump first launched his presidential campaign, he has used the slogan “America First.” It was not originally his, but—as is often the case with marketing—his team repurposed it. It could be said that it is the guiding principle behind MAGA. Since then, throughout both his terms, this principle has been used to justify a wide variety of policies focused on economic nationalism, border security, energy dominance, tighter controls on foreign investment, and other areas.
Although these policies involve foreign countries and thus touch on foreign policy, what is less clear is how “America First” applies to broader international engagement. The recent conflict between Israel and Iran illustrates this ambiguity, as it involved one of the US’s closest allies—if not the closest—and one of its main antagonists.
A central question in the debate over whether the US should intervene was whether attacking Iran aligned with “America First”—that is, whether it served the US’s core interests—or whether it served mainly those of its ally, thus making it “America Second.” This debate has exposed fractures within the MAGA movement.
On one side are the noninterventionists, among them Steve Bannon, Tucker Carlson, and Marjorie Taylor Greene. They argued that involving US troops and resources in this conflict—and potentially being dragged into a prolonged war—was not in the national interest. Such a move, they claimed, contradicted the President’s promise to end “forever wars” and did not reflect the spirit of “America First.”
On the other side are the pro-Israel advocates and neoconservative hawks—including Ted Cruz, Lindsey Graham, and Laura Loomer—who contended that supporting Israel and preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear capabilities are in US interests. Therefore, they argued, intervention aligned with “America First.”
These opposing interpretations reflect a fundamental problem: “America First” is an abstract principle with no fixed definition, a powerful, evocative slogan that anyone can appropriate to defend their own idea of what America is and what its interests are. Its strength lies in its ambiguity—it can be molded to fit divergent views. This broad ideological flexibility works well in campaigning but becomes problematic when translated into actual policy.
Yet the debate is not simply about a campaign slogan. Because “America First” has been invoked to justify everything from tariffs to airstrikes, who defines it becomes a matter of moral and political authority—not just rhetoric. A policy labeled as “America First” may not be law, but it gains legitimacy through perceived alignment with the nation’s fundamental interests. Therefore, whoever decides what these interests are—and whether they fall under “America First”—commands auctoritas in the Roman sense.
Who holds auctoritas, and why, has been at the center of political turmoil and armed conflict throughout much of Western history. In fact, to understand the modern nation-state, it is essential to grasp how this concept has been interpreted—and where it was believed to reside—at different points in time.
According to Cicero’s axiom—“Cum potestas in populo, auctoritas in Senatu sit”—power in the Roman Republic rested with the people, but auctoritas with the Senate. Here, “power” is not to be understood in the Foucauldian sense—this predates the rise of the modern subjective individual—but as the capacity to act in concert with others. It was understood that the power to act ultimately resided in individuals acting together, but the legitimacy to decide the course of action belonged not to the individual, but to the institution above them: the Senate.
For the Romans, the State mattered more than the individual. Rome was eternal—urbs aeterna, as Albius Tibullus wrote—while individuals were mortal. Even though Rome’s power was abstract, its institutions exercised auctoritas over its citizens.
This is a very different situation from what we have today. It could be said that, if for the Romans power rested with the people and auctoritas with the Senate, in the modern nation-state auctoritas rests with the people and power with the state. This shift reflects the change in how we understand the relationship between the individual, society, and, more broadly, the surrounding environment.
With the adoption of Christianity as the religion of Rome, a debate began that continued throughout the entire European Middle Ages and shaped many of its political developments: Who holds legitimate authority—secular power or religious authority? Is the king above the Church, or is the Church above the king?
According to the Gelasian thesis (rooted in Pauline doctrine), the Pope is the true head, and temporal power is merely auxiliary. In contrast, under Justinian (notably after the codification of Roman law in the Corpus Juris Civilis), the monarch held sovereign power. Thomas Aquinas sought a synthesis, inadvertently opening the door to critiques of theocratic rule.
Later, the Bartolists proposed a new idea: auctoritas rested not with the king or pope (inherited from the Roman state), but with the people. The Council they elected represented them as the ultimate source of legitimacy. This marked the conceptual birth of modern political legitimacy for the state.
This idea aligned with the Renaissance worldview, which placed man—not God—at the center. The individual became not only a source of power but of auctoritas itself. This was the political stance of the Italian city-states.
With Hobbes and Locke, the concept of the State evolved further. Hobbes declared: “The value or worth of a man is, of all things, his price; that is to say, so much would be given by the use of his power”—a key statement in how we perceive modern human relations framed in economic terms. Hobbes’s view of the State was negative: a necessary mechanism for protection and control.
The State, in this view, was no longer a gathering for truth or wisdom—as in the Roman Senate—but an instrument of defense. This is the concept of the State that we have inherited. “America First” seems to challenge that conception, for it implies putting the continuation of the state as an end in itself. The State is increasingly being perceived not as a negative necessity (which would be the Libertarian position), as in Hobbes’s view, but a positive one, as in the Roman sense.
If that is the case, then “America First” would overrule any personal opinion. Protecting America becomes more important than the particular interests of its individuals. However, as we have explained, “America First” is an abstract slogan with no concrete, applicable definition. So whoever decides what America is, and what its interests are, holds auctoritas—even above individuals and institutions.
When the Trump administration was deliberating whether or not to bomb Iran, the debate over the meaning of “America First” intensified. In an interview with The Atlantic, Trump stated that “America First” means whatever he says. He is quoted in that phone interview as saying, “Considering that I’m the one who developed ‘America First,’ and considering that the term wasn’t used until I came along, I think I’m the one who decides that.”
This was reportedly a response to criticism that attacking Iran contradicted his own principle. Then, on June 17, Trump posted on Truth Social:
“AMERICA FIRST means many GREAT things, including the fact that IRAN CANNOT HAVE A NUCLEAR WEAPON. MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN!!!”
On June 21, Vice President J.D. Vance appeared on Fox News, stating that Trump “gets to define ‘America First’ because he is the person who ran, who was elected, and who actually leads this movement.” He further emphasized that Trump represented the core of American national interest—an interest that, according to him, includes denying nuclear weapons to Iran.
On June 22, the US launched a bombing campaign against Iran—the legality and effectiveness of which remains in question. But according to the President, the Vice President, and a host of other personalities and commentators, this was in the US interest—not because Congress decided (they remain the only body with legal authority to declare war), nor because there was intelligence about an imminent threat, nor because the American people wanted it—but because President Trump said so, as he is the only one who gets to decide what “America First” means.
