The U.S. and Israel want to redraw the face of the Middle East, as Netanyahu has explicitly stated, to ensure the continuation of Israel’s colonial project, move energy flows away from China, and gain leverage over oil prices. Iran stands in the way of that project—not simply as a hostile state, but as a systemic obstacle to a reordered region.
For much of the past decades, the Middle East had a bipolar order. On the one hand, American/Israeli hegemony; on the other, Iran as the region’s only coherent counter-system to that hegemony. Through the so-called Axis of Resistance—linking Tehran with Hezbollah, Syria, Palestinian militias, and affiliated forces across Iraq and Yemen—Iran imposed a form of negative order.
This bipolar structure constrained Israeli freedom of action, limited Arab strategic autonomy, and placed an informal ceiling on regional realignment by threatening multi-front escalation. Regional competition operated within these bounds, and Iran’s presence helped suppress open rivalry among Arab states by imposing costs on unilateral moves. However, this bipolar order is now ending.
The U.S. has expressed a desire to disengage from the region—not to abandon it, but to reduce its physical engagement while offshoring control costs to allies. As a result, over the past two years, Israel together with the U.S. and other allies have conducted a systematic campaign to degrade the Axis and dismantle much of its regional proxy capacity. What remains is a collection of weakened local actors operating under financial strain, intense surveillance, and tightening escalation ceilings, alongside an Iranian state under acute pressure.
The strongest pressure on Iran, aside from last year’s “12 Days War,” has been economic, through sanctions that have crippled Iran’s economic capacity, placing serious stress on both the state and the population. This is what led to the initial protests on December 28, which were subsequently co-opted by foreign agents, most likely Mossad, as they stated. In a rare moment of honesty, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent acknowledged that sanctions were responsible for the collapse of the Iranian currency and called it a form of “statecraft.” Rather, it constitutes a form of economic warfare.
Justin Podur argues that part of the blame lies with Iranian officials who push for “financialization” and neoliberal economic policies instead of seeking alternative models. He quotes Yousef Abazari asking sardonically: “what’s the point of resisting America if Iran implements the same economic policies on its people? Iran has been attacked by many Western weapons, but among the worst weapons seems to be giving a Western economics education to many of Iran’s leaders.”
The result is the collapse of bipolarity. A regional system once bounded by American management on one side and Iranian-led resistance on the other has lost both constraints, producing an environment in which the security architecture is being redefined. Previous regional powers, such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, are extending their reach to secure their interests and fill the vacuum. New alliances are forming and new poles are emerging. It is within this context that the U.S. and Israel’s desire to attack Iran must be understood.
That is because without a U.S. counterbalance, Iran, if internationally integrated and allowed to develop its full potential, could become a hegemonic power in the region. This is something that Israel wants to avoid at all costs, including by pushing for the collapse of the state. The U.S. cannot allow this either, as it would strengthen Chinese and Russian influence in the region and place significant energy reserves outside its direct reach. Arab neighbours, though they prefer a weaker Iran, do not want to see it collapse.
However, it seems increasingly improbable that Trump will de-escalate military pressure against Iran without a prize he can market as a great triumph. It also seems increasingly improbable that such a win will come through negotiations. The Iranians are willing, as they have made abundantly clear, to negotiate, but Trump is demanding total submission, which they will not accept. This leaves very little room for a diplomatic solution.
Larry Johnson proposes three possible scenarios. The first is that the Turks, Arabs, Chinese, and Russians manage to convince the Trump administration of the risks of a military strike and persuade it to accept some symbolic concessions through negotiations. Both Johnson and I see this as the preferred scenario, but it is unlikely. If the U.S. military buildup against Venezuela is any guide, Trump would demand a trophy—ideally the Iranian Supreme Leader, Khamenei—which Iranians will not accept.
In an analysis shared at NC, Andrew Korybko proposes that Iran could avert an attack by agreeing to divert oil flows from China to India, which he considers one of the U.S. objectives. While this logic is sound, it is doubtful that such a concession would now suffice to justify de-escalation. As Yves noted in the introduction to that article, the U.S. may already have sought Iranian acquiescence to a performative strike, which Iran refused.
The second scenario is that the U.S. launches a targeted attack that causes the collapse of the Iranian government. The ensuing chaos would drive the country into civil war and possible balkanization. In this scenario, the U.S. would support a regime to control oil production under its supervision, as it claims to be doing in Venezuela, even if that regime held limited territory. This is Israel’s preferred outcome—but one most Arab states are actively trying to prevent.
Here, end-state preferences diverge sharply. Israel’s strategic horizon is regime change. It is not merely attempting to limit Iranian projection or degrade capabilities; it seeks to permanently break the Islamic Republic, without the possibility of regeneration. This objective is evident both in sustained military pressure and in Israeli messaging toward Iran’s protest movements, which consistently frame regime collapse as an acceptable—indeed, desirable—terminal outcome.
Arab preferences are fundamentally different. Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states do not want regime change in Iran. They may prefer an Iran that is weakened, constrained, and internationally isolated—but not a collapsing state whose internal convulsions could spill across borders or trigger uncontrolled escalation. At the same time, they also oppose the opposite outcome: a secular, wealthy, internationally reintegrated Iran normalized with the West and capable of stable relations with both Washington and Israel. Such an Iran would become a formidable competitor for regional primacy.
This preference is inseparable from oil market dynamics. The normalization of Iran would allow production to return to four million barrels per day or more. Combined with a potential rehabilitation of Venezuelan output, this would inject massive supply into already volatile markets, undermining OPEC+ leverage and depressing prices at precisely the moment Saudi Arabia requires elevated revenues to sustain domestic transformation. From Riyadh’s perspective, a sanctioned Iran is economically advantageous. Iranian normalization threatens the material foundations of Saudi power.
This divergence produces a recurring structural collision between Saudi and Israeli strategies. Israel seeks regime collapse as a terminal victory; Saudi Arabia seeks a weakened but intact Islamic Republic kept in pariah status. Both countries are reportedly trying to influence Trump—Israel in favor of a military strike, Saudi Arabia in favor of de-escalation.
The third scenario—and the most probable if the U.S. neither stands down nor reaches an agreement—is a protracted conflict. The U.S. and Israel would achieve initial strikes, but as air defenses are depleted, Iran would begin striking sensitive targets, as seen in the so-called “12 Days War.” As Johnson notes, if combat lasts more than two weeks, U.S. operations become extremely difficult—especially if the Strait of Hormuz is closed.
Simplicius suggests the U.S. may attempt a naval blockade, following what the U.S. administration perceives as success in Venezuela, to force concessions or internal defections. This is a variation of the first scenario and substantially misreads the situation. Iran holds regional leverage that Venezuela never had. China and Russia, due to proximity and strategic interests, would be far more inclined to provide support. And for Washington, sustaining a prolonged pressure campaign without a clear justification would be politically costly.
What these scenarios do not consider is what Julian Macfarlane describes, quoting Shivan Mahendrarajah, as Iran’s pivot to consider U.S. and Israeli military and economic pressure from a “manageable conflict” to as an “existential threat”.
Accordingly, Iran’s leadership has concluded that “if Tehran does not ‘sort out’ the U.S./Israel problem in the immediate future, the Islamic Republic of Iran will collapse under the crushing weight of sanctions, currency devaluation, inflation, socio-economic unrest, and the system’s internal contradictions. Iran needs a complete solution to its U.S./Israel problem.”
This may compel Iran’s leadership to seek out conflict and attempt to cause maximum damage. “Iran’s most powerful tool is its ability to wage economic warfare—to wit, jack up oil and gas prices and crash U.S., U.K., and EU equity markets and the dollar,” writes Macfarlane.
Faced with this most plausible scenario, the question is why the U.S. has chosen the path of escalation. The justifications do not hold. If Iran’s nuclear program was already “obliterated,” then escalation cannot plausibly be about non-proliferation. Iran had previously accepted monitored enrichment until Trump withdrew, and it was attacked while negotiations were ongoing.
Nor does the protest justification stand. Initial demonstrations were triggered by economic mismanagement and reversed policy decisions. What followed those initial protests was a two-week destabilization and propaganda campaign, reportedly directed by Mossad and the CIA and amplified by Western media with inflated casualty figures. This does not constitute a credible humanitarian rationale for war.
Israel’s lobbyists in Washington cannot be underestimated, but they should not be overestimated either. Over the past year, Israel has faced an unprecedented situation: not that the U.S. has withdrawn or diminished its support, but that Netanyahu was no longer certain how far that support could be extended. This can be inferred from the numerous trips to the U.S. since Trump became president. The Israeli lobby must have sold this attack not only as beneficial for Israel, but also as beneficial for the U.S. Given Trump’s transactional approach, ideology alone cannot explain the decision.
If similarities to Venezuela are to serve as a guide, then the U.S. is after control of the oil. It could accept a submissive regime in Tehran after extracting its public prize, while controlling oil flows and revenues. By controlling Iranian oil together with Venezuelan oil, the U.S. would control the largest share of oil reserves in the world. This would provide leverage against China and allow the U.S. to counteract OPEC+ price movements at a time when Saudi Arabia needs high prices and Trump needs low prices to rein in domestic energy costs ahead of the midterms. The strength of the dollar may also be part of the equation.
The U.S. and Israel are out to “change the face of the Middle East,” each for its own reasons—some of which collide. Arab countries, emerging from decades of American hegemony that suppressed their ambitions and rivalries, are confronting a new reality that requires redrawing alliances. The Islamic Republic of Iran has been preparing for this moment almost since its inception. The question is whether it will stand.
